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Abstract 
Based on the economic theory of the family, this paper constructs a model of remittances 
where the migrant, besides sending money to his family, also invests in his home country. The 
investment is looked after by a family member in return for some monetary compensation. The 
model focuses on two different cases: state-contingent transfers (transfers are tied to 
investment outcomes) and fixed transfers (transfers are mainly of altruistic motive). As the 
migrant derives utilities from consumption, his consumption-investment decision is driven by 
preferences and future investment prospects. The transfers are to increase with both business 
encouraging and income compensatory effects.  
JEL classification: D31, J61, O15, O16. 





Recently, there has been a substantial increase in remittance flows from developed countries 
to developing countries. An estimate by the World Bank (2007) indicates that total 
remittances to developing economies amounted up to $240 billion in 2007 from $31.2 billion 
in 1990. The actual numbers are surely much larger given the fact that official statistics miss 
informal inflows. This information suggests that remittances are potentially a good source of 
finance for economic development, especially for the poorest countries. 
There is a considerable debate on the role of remittances to economic development process of 
developing countries. Remittance supporters posit that remittances help improve recipients’ 
standard of living and encourage households’ investment in education and healthcare. 
Remittances are also necessary for financing imports and investment. However, the negative 
view of remittances indicates that remittances can fuel inflation and reduce recipients’ 
incentive to work which are obviously harmful for growth. Empirical studies on the economic 
impact of remittances also produce mixed results (see, for example, Glytsos, 2002; Leon-
Ledesma and Piracha, 2004; Chami et al., 2005). 
This paper contributes to the above mentioned debate over the economic impact of 
remittances by constructing a theoretical model in which remittances act like a capital inflow 
besides an income transfer from overseas. The model is set up based on the economic theory 
of the family
1 where the relationship between a migrant and his family back home is 
characterized by both altruism (as suggested by Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974) and business 
(as pointed by Lucas and Stark, 1985).
2 The relationship is altruistic in the sense that the 
migrant cares about his family and makes his utility dependent on the family member’s utility. 
                                                 
1 There is a big literature on the economic theory of family, especially on the aspect of private income transfers 
such as Bernheim et al. (1985), Cox (1987), and Chami (1998).   
2 For simplicity, the migrant’s family back home is assumed to consist of only one member. 3 
 
It is also business-like because the migrant makes investment in his home country and asks 
the family member to look after the investment project on his behalf. In return, the migrant 
offers the family member some monetary transfer. In this framework, remittances include two 
different flows: a capital flow and an income transfer flow. As a result, remittances are not 
only compensatory but also business motivated. To make it more general, this paper 
differentiates two different situations. In the first situation, the migrant ties the transfer to the 
outcome of the investment project. This creates an incentive for the recipient to exert more 
managerial effort. In the second situation, the migrant makes a transfer simply based on his 
altruistic motive. 
The results of the model can be summarized as follows. Despite having different settings, the 
two above mentioned situations yield qualitatively close findings. They both reveal that 
remittances are not only a pure income transfer which help increase consumption at home but 
also an important source of finance for economic development through investment channel. 
Here, remittances increase with business encouraging as well as income compensatory 
motives. In particular, the migrant will invest more in his home country if the expected gain 
from making extra investment is high enough. He will send more monetary payment home if 
his income is higher, when his family member is poor, or when he wants to encourage his 
relative to exert more effort in managing his investment project. The family member will act 
more positively on the migrant’s project when she cares more about the migrant and when the 
promised monetary rewards are higher.  
Generally, this paper is well placed into the literature on remittances. It is linked to the theory 
on altruistic motivations for remittances (e.g. Johnson and Whitelaw, 1974; Chami et al., 
2005) as well as the theory on self-interested remittances as a means of business (e.g. Lucas 
and Stark, 1985). Although not study here, this paper recognizes the theory that considers the 
family as a source of insurance company that provides members with protection from any 4 
 
income shocks (Poirine, 1997; Ilahi and Jafarey, 1999) or a bank that finances the migration 
of the members (Stark, 1991; Agerwal and Horowitz, 2002; Gubert, 2002).
3 By modeling 
explicitly financial development as a factor that encourages investment from remittance flow, 
this paper also fits well in the literature on financial market and economic development (e.g. 
Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005; Mundaca, 2009). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical model on 
remittances and investment motives. Section 3 documents some implications and further 
discussions on the results of the model in Section 2. Section 4 ends the paper with some 
concluding remarks.       
2. Theoretical models for analyzing remittances 
Consider an economy which consists of a large number of identical two-person families that 
live for two periods.
4 In each family, one person has already migrated to a foreign country at 
the beginning of the first period. He earns an exogenous income    in that foreign country. 
The other member of the family remains in the home country. She works in the domestic 
labor market and earns an exogenous income   . In the first period, the migrant makes an 
investment  	 in his home country
5 and asks the family member at home to take care of this 
investment.
6 Assume that the investment outcome is subject to uncertainty. For simplicity, 
there are only two possible outcomes for this investment, either high outcome    =
   ,   >1  with probability   or low outcome    =    ,0 <    <1  with probability 
                                                 
3 Rapoport and Docquier (2005) provide a comprehensive review on the economics of remittances. 
4 This is a simplified assumption that does not affect the model results. The game can be allowed to play 
repeatedly. 
5 Of course, there is always an option of investing overseas. However, dealing with this option is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
6 Unlike the model by Chami et al. (2005) where the migrant send remittances home as a pure altruistic transfer, 
in this current model, the migrant is allowed to invest in his home country from overseas. This is a crucial 
assumption that makes this paper distinct from other papers in the literature which commonly assume an 
altruistic motive for remittances. 5 
 
(1 −  ). Here, the probability of high investment outcome occurring is dependent on the 
favorable conditions in the financial market   (such as more investment opportunities or low 
risks) as well as the effort level  	 in managing the investment project of the family member 
at home. Assume  ( , ) is an increasing and concave function of its two arguments, 
  (.) >0 ,    (.) <0 .
7 In the second period, the migrant makes a transfer to the family 
member at home (from now on this family member is referred to as the recipient). This paper 
focuses its analysis on two different practical situations: investment state-contingent transfers 
and fixed transfers. 
2.1. State-contingent transfers 
It can be imagined as there exists an implicit agreement between the migrant and the 
recipient, for example, an implicit agreement between a brother and a sister, in which the 
brother working overseas seeks for helps from his sister at home in managing the investment 
project and offers her some monetary rewards in return. As the migrant is away, he does not 
know or observe his sister’s effort level directly. However, he can see the outcome of the 
investment project at the end of the first period which depends on his sister’s effort. The 
migrant is then assumed to tie the monetary rewards to the investment results. If the project is 
successful, the migrant transfers a large amount of money back home    to the recipient. If it 
is not successful, only a small amount of money    is transferred.
8 Both of these amounts are 
known to the recipient ex ante. 
The migrant derives utility from his consumption which is equal to    −   in the first period 
and equal to either    +    −   	 or    +    −    depending on whether the investment 
project is successful or not in the second period. His expected utility is: 
                                                 
7 An example for such a function is  ( ) =   
 
     
 
     where  >0  is a constant. 
8 For a simple case,    is very much like an altruistic transfer while    is business related transfer. 6 
 
 (  ) =  (   − ) +    (   +    −   ) + (1−  ) (   +    −   ) +   (  )    (1) 
where 0< <1  is the discount factor for his relative utility. Here, the migrant not only 
cares about the outcome of his investment project at home but is also altruistic towards his 
sister. As a result, his utility depends on the recipient’s utility   .	The utility function is 
assumed to be increasing, concave, and twice differentiable   (.) >0 ,	     (.) <0 . The 
migrant benefits more if his investment is more profitable so    −    >    −   . In other 
words, he extracts more surpluses if the investment is successful. 
The recipient also derives utility from consumption. Her expected utility is: 
 (  ) =  (  ) +  ( ) (   +   ) +  1−  ( )  (   +   ) − ( )             (2) 
where  ( ) denotes disutility of effort expended on the migrant’s investment project and 
  ( ) >0 ,  " (   )>0 .  
For simplicity of notation, define     ≡  (   +    −   ),     ≡  (   +    −   ),     ≡
 (   +   ),     ≡  (   +   ). Here,     >    ,     >     but    
  <    
  ,    
  <    
   
according to the assumption on the increasing and concave utility function. 
The model can be solved by backward induction. First, the recipient chooses her effort level 
that maximizes her expected utility given her labor income and the monetary reward 
contingent on the outcome of the investment project that she manages. The migrant then 
makes a decision on the investment and the transfer based on the realization of the investment 
project. 
The first order condition for the recipient’s choice of effort is:  7 
 
  (  )
   =  ′ ( )     −      −  ′ ( ) =0                                     (3) 
This equation states that the marginal benefit (in utility term) of exerting effort is equal to the 
marginal disutility of expending that effort level. Solving the equation implicitly delivers 
 ∗ =  (    ,   ,   ). This leads to the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. 
  ∗
   
<0 ,
  ∗
   
>0 ,
  ∗
   
<0 ,
  ∗
   
=0 . 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
That is, the recipient’s effort decreases with her income. As the monetary rewards are known 
to both parties ex ante, raising the rewards of high investment outcome or reducing the 
transfer of low investment outcome would increase the recipient’s effort (the business 
encouraging effect). The commitment of transferring a positive amount when investment 
outcome is low creates a disincentive for effort since it provides more certainty of income 
whereas the transfer in high investment outcome case creates more incentives for inducing 
higher effort. In addition, it can be seen that  
  ∗
   
=
  ∗
   
+
  ∗
   
		which implies that an increase 
in the recipient’s income is equivalent to an increase in transfers in both states of investment. 
It costs more for the migrant if he wants the recipient to exert an extra amount of effort. In 
other words, the disincentive effect exceeds the incentive effect of positive transfers. The 
recipient’s optimal effort is found to be independent from the migrant’s income as under this 
incentive scheme, the recipient is more concerned about how much money she can get from 
the migrant (the monetary rewards) rather than the migrant’s income. 
As for the migrant, he chooses the investment level as well as the amounts of transfer to be 
made,   	and   , that corresponds to the investment project outcomes,    and   , respectively 
in order to maximize his expected utility. The first order conditions are: 8 
 
   
   =−    
  +      
     + (1−  )   
     =0                                 (4) 
  (  )
   
=   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
 (    −    ) + (    −    )  +  ( ∗)(    
  −    
  ) −
   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
=0                                                                                                               (5) 
  (  )
   
=   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
 (    −    ) + (    −    )  +  1−  ( ∗) (    
  −    
  ) −
   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
=0                                                                                                                (6) 
It should be noted that the derivation in equation (4) uses the assumptions that    =     and 
   =    . The equation implies that investment is future consumption. At optimal, the utility 
cost of making investment in the first period is equal to the expected utility gain of that 
investment in the second period. Solving the equation implicitly delivers the optimal 
investment level  ∗. It would be interesting to examine how a change in financial market 
conditions, captured by  , or a change in the migrant’s income,   , would affect this 
investment level. As a result, the two following propositions are made. 
Proposition 2. 
  ∗
   >0  if 	
   
 





Proof. See Appendix. 
Here, 
   
 
   
   reflects the marginal rate of change or the cost in terms of utility between two 
states of investment – profitable and lost. By contrast, 
  
  
 indicates the premium or the surplus 
in monetary terms between these two states. The result implies that when the financial market 
condition becomes more favorable (represented by an increase in  ), the migrant will increase 9 
 
his investment back home if the expected monetary gain outweighs the expected utility loss 
resulting from such an investment increase. However, when the cost is more than the gain, he 
will very likely cut down the investment level. His investment decision will be indifferent if 
the expected cost is equal to the expected gain. 
The intuition is as follows. An increase in   raises the probability of successful investment as 
the financial market now becomes healthier, contains lower risks, and provides more 
investment opportunities. This creates both an income effect and a substitution effect. The 
income effect tends to induce higher investment as well as higher consumption to the migrant. 
However, the substitution effect tends to make the migrant to move away from investment 
and more into consumption. Whether the optimal level of investment is higher or lower with 




   
>0  if   
   <        
   + (1−  )     
   . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
The result signifies the trade-off between current consumption and future consumption in 
which investment plays a role as the cost to the current consumption but the return to future 
consumption (in terms of utility). As soon as the loss in marginal utility of current 
consumption is smaller than the expected gain in marginal utility of future consumption, the 
migrant will increase the investment level to his home country when his income is higher. 
This can also be explained on the ground of income effect and substitution effect as what was 
provided after Proposition 2.  10 
 




   
   ( ∗)(    −    ) −   ( ∗)  +   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
(    −    ) +  ( ∗)(    
  −
   
  ) =0                                                                                                                         (5’) 
 
  ∗
   
   ( ∗)(    −    ) −   ( ∗)  +   ( ∗)
  ∗
   
(    −    ) +  1−  ( ∗) (    
  −
   
  ) =0                                                                                                                 (6’) 
In both equations, the first term reflects the (indirect) impact of the recipient’s choice of effort 
on the migrant’s utility and is equal to zero according to (3). The second term reflects the 
increase in the migrant’s utility due to an extra effort from the recipient. The third term shows 
the trade-off in terms of utility of consumption between the migrant and the recipient due to 
additional transfer. Solving (5’) implicitly yields   
∗ =   (  ,   ,   ,   ). Similarly, solving 
(6’) implicitly yields   
∗ =   (  ,   ,   ,   ). 
Proposition 4. 
   
∗
   
>0 ,
    
∗
   
<0 ,
   
∗
   
<o r>0 ,
   
∗
   
<0 ,
   
∗
   >0 	  
And  
    
∗
   
< 0,			
   
∗
   
> 0,			
    
∗
   
>0 ,
   
∗
   
<0 ,
   
∗
   >0 . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Results obtained indicate that the amount transferred increases with the investment outcome 
surplus (represented by the difference between   	and   ) but does not necessarily increase 
with the migrant’s income. The migrant’s reaction to changes in investment outcomes reflect 
the fact that he intends for remittances to reward the recipient’s efforts (the business 
encouraging effect). Here, remittances are meant to be used mainly for the case of better 11 
 
realization of investment output at which the recipient exerts a higher level of effort. 
However, the transfers decrease with the recipient’s income (the income compensatory 
effect). This implies that besides providing more incentives for the recipient to expend higher 
effort (the business related motive), remittances can also be compensatory (the altruistic 
motive). This argument is further strengthened by the results that the transfers are shown to 
increase with the migrant’s degree of altruism towards the recipient.   
2.2. Fixed transfers 
By contrast to the first situation just exposed, now assume that the migrant transfers to the 
recipient a fixed amount of money regardless of the outcome of the investment project. The 
reason why the migrant does not tie the money rewards to the investment outcome in this case 
because he knows that the recipient also cares about him (that is why it may not be necessary 
to have such an incentive scheme as before). The relationship between the migrant and his 
relative can now be imagined in a most natural way as the one between a son (the migrant) 
and his parent (the recipient). As a result, there exists mutual (two-sided) altruism between the 
two individuals. 
The expected utility for the migrant is as follows:  
 (  ) =  (   − ) +    (   +    − ) + (1−  ) (   +    − ) +    (  )   (7) 
where 0<    <1  is the discount factor for the migrant which reflects his degree of altruism 
towards his parent.  
The expected utility for the recipient now becomes: 12 
 
 (  ) =  (  ) + (   + ) − ( ) +    (  )                            (8) 
where  0<    <1   denotes the discount factor for the recipient which also reflects her 
degree of altruism towards her son. 
For simplicity of notation, define     ≡  (   +    − ),     ≡  (   +    − ). Solving 
this system of equations gives: 
 (  ) =
 
      
  (   − ) +       + (1−  )    +    (  ) +    (   + ) −
   ( )                                                                                                                             (9) 
 (  ) =
 
      
  (  ) + (   + ) − ( ) +    (   − )+        +
  (1−  )                                                                                                                (10) 
Again, the model can be solved by backward induction in which the recipient chooses her 
effort level to maximize her expected utility given the amount of money to be received and 
her labor income; the migrant chooses his levels of investment and transfer to maximize his 
expected utility. The first order condition for the recipient’s decision on effort level to expend 
is:   
  (  )
   =
 
      
 −  ( ) +     ( )(    −    )  =0                        (11) 
The interpretation of this equation is as the following. While expending some extra effort acts 
as disutility, −  ( ), it raises the recipient’s utility by increasing the chance of the migrant 
getting utility surplus. 
Proposition 5. 
  ∗
   
<0 ,
  ∗
   
=0 ,
  ∗
   >0 ,
  ∗
   
>0 . 	  13 
 
Proof. See Appendix.  
It can be seen that the impact of changes in incomes of both agents on the recipient’s effort 
are different from the incentive transfer case. The first difference is that the recipient’s effort 
now decreases with the migrant’s income. This might be because the marginal increase in the 
migrant’s utility is less than the recipient’s disutility from exerting extra effort. The second 
difference is that the recipient’s decision on exerting effort is invariant to her own income. 
This is because in this case, the recipient cares about the migrant’s well-being. A change in 
her income does not change her altruism towards the migrant.  
The conditions also say that an increase in the transfer raises the recipient’s effort level 
because monetary compensation offers her more incentive to exert effort (business 
encouragement). This effect is the same as in the case of state-contingent transfers. Another 
interesting result is the recipient will work harder on the investment project if she is more 
altruistic towards the migrant. This result makes sense as both agents are altruistic to each 
other. 
As for the migrant, his strategic move is to choose the level of investment to be made as well 
as the amount of remittances to be transferred back home such that his utility is maximized. 
The first order conditions are given by: 
  (  )
   =
 
      
 −  
  +      
     + (1−  )   
      =0                   (12) 
  (  )
   =
 
      
 −    
  − (1−  )   
  +     (   + )  =0                (13) 
As the condition in equation (12) is similar to that of equation (6), its interpretation follows 
what is given to equation (6). Therefore, in this case, the migrant is expected to behave 
exactly the same as in the case of state-contingent transfers in forming his investment 14 
 
decision. His investment responses to a change in the level of financial development and his 
income level are the same as what discussed under propositions 2 and 3 above. 
Equation (13) indicates that the migrant’s utility is maximized when the cost (in utility terms) 
of additional transfer, reflected by the first two terms inside the bracket, is equal to the benefit 
(in terms of utility) of it which is reflected by the last term inside the bracket. While the utility 
cost is a direct effect as the migrant’s consumption falls, the utility benefit is an indirect effect 
as the migrant derives utility from the recipient’s extra consumption.  
Proposition 6. 
  ∗
   
>0 ,
  ∗
   
<0 ,
  ∗
   
>0 ,
  ∗
   
>0 ,
  ∗
   
>0 . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
That is, similar to the previous case of state-contingent transfers, the migrant’s transfer 
increases with his degree of altruism and the investment outcome surplus but decreases with 
the recipient’s income (due to income compensatory effect). The only difference lies in the 
result that the transfer increases with the migrant’s income while it is not clearly the case 
under the incentive scheme. The reason is that the migrant is more altruistic towards the 
recipient in this case so he will send more money home when he earns higher income 
overseas. Again, the obtained results show that remittances may contain both business 
encouraging and income compensatory effects.   
3. Some implications and further discussions 
The above theoretical consideration has been concerned with a model of investment 
remittances which examines two different practical situations of migrant-recipient 
relationship. Although the settings of these two cases are different, the results obtained are 15 
 
qualitatively the same. They both point out several important implications regarding the 
causes and effects of remittances: 
(i)  The migrant sends more money home when his earnings are higher. 
(ii) The recipient tends to receive more income transfer from overseas when her income is 
lower (income compensatory effect). 
(iii)    The migrant’s decision on the division of income between consumption and 
investment is driven by intertemporal preferences and information about future 
investment prospective. More specifically, he will invest more in his home country if 
the expected gain from such an activity is high enough. 
(iv)    Remittance transfer increases with successful investment outcomes as monetary 
rewards to the recipient for taking care of the migrant’s investment project at home 
(business encouraging effect). It also increases with the migrant’s degree of altruism 
towards the recipient. 
(v)  The recipient tends to exert more managerial effort on the investment project when 
her income is low, when more financial rewards through remittances are promised in 
advance (business encouraging effect), or when she is more altruistic towards the 
migrant. 
It can be seen that results in (i) and (ii) are fairly general. They reflect the altruistic motive. The 
predictions in (iii), (iv), and (v) are consistent with both investment-business hypothesis and the 
altruistic hypothesis. While the altruistic motive is clear and receives a fair amount of attention 
in the literature, the business oriented motive is generally new and worth examining further. 
So far, the model in the paper has been assuming that the recipient’s incentive to exert effort 
is independent financial development in affecting the probability of success in making 16 
 
investment. The parameter   is meant to capture the favorable financial market condition.
9 If 
  is unchanged, an increase in   will lead to an increase in  ( , ) as there are more good 
opportunities for doing business
10 and, hence, the expected returns on investment will be 
higher. This is an incentive for the migrant to invest in his home country from overseas and it 
is expected that there will be more remittances devoted to investment.
11 However, one may 
argue that the increase in   is not totally free of charge as there might be a moral hazard 
problem involved: the recipient might not exert as much effort as previously (  may be 
lower). Whether  ( , ) increases or decreases will depend on the relative change in 
magnitudes of   and  . As a result, the investment outcome and, hence, total investment out 
of remittances, will also be subject to this relative change. This creates a puzzle on the role of 
financial market development in extracting investment from remittances. Examining this issue 
will open an important new research project. 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has developed a model which allows it to examine the motivation for sending 
remittances. Remittances are made both due to altruistic and business doing motivations. It is 
shown that remittances not only compensate the recipients for unfavorable economic 
conditions but also serve as an important flow of capital as well as monetary rewards for 
investment managerial efforts. From macroeconomic stance, this creates two opposing effects 
of remittances in the relationship with home country’s income level. While the compensatory 
                                                 
9 This condition may include any good policy that enhances the likelihood of successful investment such as 
regulatory policy, macroeconomic conditions, and institutions, etc. These factors are generally correlated with 
financial development. By financial development this paper refers to the development of the financial sector per 
se as well as infrastructure that supports that system. 
10 This is one positive aspect of financial development. Other aspects include better insurance against shocks and 
better diversifying rate of return risks, etc. 
11 One may argue that the lack of financial development leads to high returns to capital for those who can access 
it and remittances may be sent back to take advantage of business opportunities that local financing is unable to 
take advantage of. This may be true for some particular cases. However, when the financial system is 
underdeveloped, there are often high risks associated with these high returns. In the end, on average, the risk 
adjusted returns may not be as high as they first appear to be.  17 
 
effect results in a negative relationship with income growth which is consistent with the 
literature, the business encouraging effect is positive since it stimulates remittances for 
investment purposes. This is a novel aspect of the paper. This aspect makes remittances a 
potentially important source of finance for economic development. It highlights the role of 
financial development in mobilizing investment for productive activities from this source of 
finance. 
The lesson to learn is that in countries where there is an effective financial system in place, 
the business encouraging effect may dominate the compensatory effect and remittances have a 
net positive contribution to economic development. Remittances and financial development 
can be complementary and they may interact to promote growth. Testing this hypothesis will 
surely enrich the literature. From economic policy point of view, countries should aim to 
improve the local conditions (i.e. infrastructure, legal framework, etc.) in general and the local 
financial system in particular. This will attract more remittances from overseas for productive 
activities and allow recipient countries to optimize the potential benefits of remittances. 
Appendix - Mathematical proofs of propositions 
In the proofs that follow, conclusions on directions of inequalities are reached based on the 
standard assumptions made on the utility and probability functions, specifically:   (.) >
0,   (.) <0 ;   (.) >0 ,    (.) <0 ; and   (.) >0 ,    (.) <0 . 
Proof of Proposition 1  
Using the condition specified in (3), it can be derived as follows: 
  ∗
   
=
  ( ∗)(   
  −    
  )
   ( ∗)(    −    ) −    ( ∗)
<0  18 
 
  ∗
   
=
−  ( ∗)   
 
   ( ∗)(    −    ) −    ( ∗)
>0  
  ∗
   
=
 ′( ∗)   
 
   ( ∗)(    −    ) −    ( ∗)
<0  
  ∗
   
=0  
Proof of Proposition 2 




  ( )(   
     −    
    )
  
   +  ( )   
     
  +  1−  (  )     
     
  
Given that the denominator is always negative, the sign of this derivative is determined by the 
sign of the term    
     −    
     or, by rearranging, the sign of the term 
   
 






   >0 	  if 
   
 





Proof of Proposition 3 
From (4) it can be derived the following: 
  ∗
   
=
  
   −        
   − (1−  )     
  
  
   +     
    
   + (1−  )  
    
    19 
 
As the denominator is negative, the sign of this derivative is dependent on the sign of the 
terms in the numerator or   
   −        
   − (1−  )     
   . Therefore, 
  ∗
   
>0  if   
   <
      
   + (1−  )     
   . 
Proof of Proposition 4  
Differentiating (5’) with respect to    and   	gives: 
   
∗
   
=
 ( ∗)   
   −   ( ∗)  ∗
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Similarly, differentiating (6’) with respect to    and	   gives: 
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Proof of Proposition 5 
Using condition (11), the following results can be obtained: 
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Proof of Proposition 6 
From (13), it can be derived the following results: 
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